Vulnerable Components

The challenges in this chapter are all about security issues of libraries or other 3rd party components the application uses internally.

Challenges covered in this chapter

Name Description Difficulty
Arbitrary File Write Overwrite the Legal Information file. ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐
Forged Signed JWT Forge an almost properly RSA-signed JWT token that impersonates the (non-existing) user rsa_lord@juice-sh.op. ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐
Frontend Typosquatting Inform the shop about a typosquatting imposter that dug itself deep into the frontend. (Mention the exact name of the culprit) ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐
Legacy Typosquatting Inform the shop about a typosquatting trick it has been a victim of at least in v6.2.0-SNAPSHOT. (Mention the exact name of the culprit) ⭐⭐⭐⭐
Supply Chain Attack Inform the development team about a danger to some of their credentials. (Send them the URL of the original report or the CVE of this vulnerability) ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐
Unsigned JWT Forge an essentially unsigned JWT token that impersonates the (non-existing) user jwtn3d@juice-sh.op. ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐
Vulnerable Library Inform the shop about a vulnerable library it is using. (Mention the exact library name and version in your comment) ⭐⭐⭐⭐

Uploaded files represent a significant risk to applications. The first step in many attacks is to get some code to the system to be attacked. Then the attack only needs to find a way to get the code executed. Using a file upload helps the attacker accomplish the first step.

The consequences of unrestricted file upload can vary, including complete system takeover, an overloaded file system or database, forwarding attacks to back-end systems, client-side attacks, or simple defacement. It depends on what the application does with the uploaded file and especially where it is stored.

There are really two classes of problems here. The first is with the file metadata, like the path and file name. These are generally provided by the transport, such as HTTP multi-part encoding. This data may trick the application into overwriting a critical file or storing the file in a bad location. You must validate the metadata extremely carefully before using it.

The other class of problem is with the file size or content. The range of problems here depends entirely on what the file is used for. See the examples below for some ideas about how files might be misused. To protect against this type of attack, you should analyse everything your application does with files and think carefully about what processing and interpreters are involved.3

  • Find all places in the application where file uploads are possible.
  • For at least one of these, the Juice Shop is depending on a library that suffers from an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability.
  • You can find a hint toward the underlying vulnerability in the @owasp_juiceshop Twitter timeline

Forge an almost properly RSA-signed JWT token

Like Forge an essentially unsigned JWT token this challenge requires you to make a valid JWT for a user that does not exist. What makes this challenge even harder is the requirement to have the JWT look like it was properly signed.

  • The three generic hints from Forge an essentially unsigned JWT token also help with this challenge.
  • Instead of enforcing no encryption to be applied, try to apply a more sophisticated exploit against the JWT libraries used in the Juice Shop.
  • Getting your hands on the public RSA key the application employs for its JWTs is mandatory for this challenge.
  • Finding the corresponding private key should actually be impossible, but that obviously doesn't make this challenge unsolvable.
  • Make sure your JWT is URL safe!

Inform the shop about a typosquatting imposter that dug itself deep into the frontend

Typosquatting, also called URL hijacking, a sting site, or a fake URL, is a form of cybersquatting, and possibly brandjacking which relies on mistakes such as typos made by Internet users when inputting a website address into a web browser. Should a user accidentally enter an incorrect website address, they may be led to any URL (including an alternative website owned by a cybersquatter).

The typosquatter's URL will usually be one of four kinds, all similar to the victim site address (e.g. example.com):

  • A common misspelling, or foreign language spelling, of the intended site: exemple.com
  • A misspelling based on typos: examlpe.com
  • A differently phrased domain name: examples.com
  • A different top-level domain: example.org
  • An abuse of the Country Code Top-Level Domain (ccTLD): example.cm by using .cm, example.co by using .co, or example.om by using .om. A person leaving out a letter in .com in error could arrive at the fake URL's website.

Once in the typosquatter's site, the user may also be tricked into thinking that they are in fact in the real site, through the use of copied or similar logos, website layouts or content. Spam emails sometimes make use of typosquatting URLs to trick users into visiting malicious sites that look like a given bank's site, for instance.1

This challenge is about identifying and reporting (via the http://localhost:3000/#/contact form) a case of typosquatting hidden in the Juice Shop. It is supposedly hard to locate.

  • This challenge has nothing to do with URLs or domains.
  • Other than for its legacy companion, combing through the package.json.bak does not help for this challenge.

ℹ️ There is no actual malice or mischief included, as the typosquatter is completely harmless. Just keep in mind that in reality, a case like this could come with negative consequences and would sometimes be even harder to identify.

Inform the shop about a typosquatting trick it has been a victim of

This challenge is about identifying and reporting (via the http://localhost:3000/#/contact form) a case of typosquatting that successfully sneaked into an older version of the Juice Shop. Luckily, it is not in use any more in v9.3.0-SNAPSHOT.

Inform the development team about a danger to some of their credentials

A software supply chain attack is when an attacker gains access to a legitimate software vendor and then compromises either the software or update repository. This is done with the intention of installing a backdoor, or other malicious code, into the legitimate software update provided by the vendor. As users update their software, unwittingly falling victim to the Trojanized update, they also install the embedded malicious code.4

ℹ️ Please note that having the OWASP Juice Shop installed on your computer does not put you at any actual risk! This challenge does neither install a backdoor or Trojan nor does it bring any other harmful code to your system!

  • The shop's end users are not the targets here. The developers of the shop are!
  • This is a research-heavy challenge which does not involve any actual hacking.
  • Solving Access a developer's forgotten backup file before attempting this challenge will save you from a lot of frustration.

Forge an essentially unsigned JWT token

JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.2

This challenge involves forging a valid JWT for a user that does not exist in the database but make the application believe it is still legit.

  • You should begin with retrieving a valid JWT from the application's Authorization request header.
  • A JWT is only given to users who have logged in. They have a limited validity, so better do not dawdle.
  • Try to convince the site to give you a valid token with the required payload while downgrading to no encryption at all.
  • Make sure your JWT is URL safe!

Inform the shop about a vulnerable library it is using

This challenge is quite similar to Inform the shop about an algorithm or library it should definitely not use the way it does with the difference, that here not the general use of the library is the issue. The application is just using a version of a library that contains known vulnerabilities.

  • Use the Contact Us form to submit a feedback mentioning the vulnerable library including its exact version.
  • Look for possible dependencies related to security in the package.json.bak you probably harvested earlier during the Access a developer's forgotten backup file challenge.
  • Do some research on the internet for known security issues in the most suspicious application dependencies.
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Typosquatting
2. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519
3. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Unrestricted_File_Upload
4. https://www.rsa.com/en-us/blog/2017-02/are-software-supply-chain-attacks-the-new-norm

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